Grab's fall of roughly 70% from its US$40 billion Nasdaq debut has become a case study in founder control, as chief executive Anthony Tan retains about 60% voting power while holding only a small economic stake. During earlier merger talks with Gojek, Grab was reported to have sought terms that would have made Tan de facto chief executive for life, alarming some investors.
Grab listed in December 2021 through a merger with Altimeter Growth Corp, then the largest blank-cheque deal of its kind, raising about US$4.5 billion. Shares opened at US$13.06 and fell more than 20% on the first day, wiping out roughly US$17 billion in value; Tan briefly crossed into billionaire territory on paper before his stake was valued closer to US$725 million. The stock later sank far further, and commentary in Bloomberg and elsewhere framed the decline as a test of Singapore's ambition to produce global consumer-tech giants.
The governance structure is central to the criticism. Tan controls a clear majority of voting rights through super-voting shares while owning only around 3% of the common stock, an arrangement far more lopsided than those of many US founders. Commentators also noted family presence on the board in Grab's earlier years. Dual-class structures are common in technology, but the wider the gap between control and economic exposure, the louder the question from public investors: who can remove the chief executive if the strategy fails?
The Gojek episode sharpened that question years before the listing. Nikkei Asia reported that in merger negotiations with its Indonesian rival, Grab sought conditions including Tan as long-term leader, substantial voting power, veto rights over board decisions and influence over his own compensation, with succession arrangements discussed in the event of his death. Grab later told concerned investors the proposal had been misinterpreted and that any combined group would comply with listing rules. Gojek ultimately merged with Tokopedia to form GoTo instead.
To Grab's defenders, the focus on structure ignores operating reality. Founded in 2012 as a taxi app, Grab operates across eight countries and hundreds of cities in rides, food delivery and payments, and it has had to fight subsidised wars in markets with different languages, regulations and incomes. Singapore's small home market means its champions must win abroad or not at all, and Tan has remained in post while counterparts at Uber and WeWork departed in disgrace — a comparison sometimes made in his favour.
Investors, however, price results. Grab accumulated very large losses over its first decade, and later insider share sales by Tan, even when explained as pre-scheduled trading-plan disposals, have been read by a sceptical market as a confidence signal. Periodic purchases by executives have produced only brief rallies.
The Grab debate is therefore bigger than one stock. It asks what public shareholders are buying in founder-led Southeast Asian platforms: alignment through control, or entrenchment without accountability. Until earnings make the question academic, every Grab result will be read twice — once for the numbers, and once for the governance discount embedded in them.